How Private Market Investors Are Managing the Conflict: Here’s What They Told Us
Middle East Investor Network, May 2026
When the outbreak of the Iran conflict in late February 2026 brought much of the region to a standstill, the investment community found itself navigating unfamiliar and rapidly shifting terrain. Travel halted, in-person meetings ceased, and the clarity that had defined the Gulf's growth story was replaced, almost overnight, by uncertainty. While the conflict put much of normal business life on hold, the Middle East Investor Network made a deliberate decision to keep the conversation going. Over six weeks, we convened a series of five digital boardrooms, attended by over 270 participants from across the private markets investment community, to provide a platform to stay connected, share perspectives, and think clearly during a period when clear thinking was precisely what was needed most. Each session brought together senior investors, fund managers, advisors, and allocators under Chatham House rule to discuss, candidly and without attribution, the issues that mattered. What follows is a summary of each session and the key themes that emerged.
Session One: Asset Management During Times of Conflict
How to Navigate a Crisis | 26 March 2026 | Participating Firms: Franklin Templeton, Asas Capital, Neovision Wealth Management
The first session set the tone for the series. Launched in weeks following the conflict's outbreak, it addressed the most pressing question facing the region's asset managers: what do you do on day one?
The mood among participants was serious but measured. The consensus was that the instinct to reach clients quickly and communicate calmly was not just good client service but a strategic necessity. Firms that had built deep, trusted relationships prior to the conflict were better positioned to provide reassurance, while those with weaker connectivity scrambled to establish contact.
On portfolio positioning, the early response among participants was consistent: reduce leverage, trim equity exposure where possible, and move toward cash in jurisdictions considered less exposed. The conversation was not one of panic but of discipline. Several participants noted they had already been reducing risk into the end of 2025, meaning the conflict accelerated rather than initiated a process already underway.
The discussion turned to the GCC's structural resilience. Participants pointed to the scale of sovereign reserves, the diversification programmes already underway across the Gulf states, and the preparedness infrastructure that had been quietly built over years. The region's war chest, as one participant described it, was substantial and the ability to absorb short-term shocks was real. However, the impact on the UAE's aura of stability was acknowledged. Political risk had previously ranked low in the assessments of investors choosing the region. That calculus had now shifted.
Family offices were a particular focus. The near-term response was one of recalibration rather than exit. Jurisdictional diversification was moving from an abstract consideration to a practical priority, with participants discussing the need for parallel records, secondary command structures, and alternative banking arrangements in neutral jurisdictions. Newcomers considering a move to the region were pausing, not departing, but the pause was real.
On the opportunity side, participants identified infrastructure resilience as the most compelling post-conflict investment theme: water technology, agri-tech, desalination capacity, rail and logistics corridors, and defence related infrastructure. Public-private partnership structures were seen as the mechanism through which private capital would be invited to participate in rebuilding. Logistics and supply chain infrastructure, already under pressure from Strait of Hormuz disruptions, were flagged as priorities likely to attract significant institutional interest.
Gold was discussed in depth, with one participant noting that a 25 percent allocation to gold had been a deliberate positioning choice for several years and had provided meaningful stability during the early weeks of the conflict. The broader message was one of preparation: those who had built resilient portfolios before February 2026 were navigating the crisis with considerably more composure than those who had not. The session closed with a clear message: remain calm, look for opportunities, and begin preparing now for the day after.
Session Two: GCC Real Estate Outlook
Risk Management, Value Protection, and the 2026 Recovery Map | 2 April 2026 | Participating Firms: GFH Financial Group, Arzan Investment Management, Gewan Holding
The second session addressed one of the most widely discussed topics in the region's investment landscape: what the conflict meant for real estate. The headline picture painted by international media, of a sector in freefall, was challenged directly by participants with firsthand knowledge of the market.
The nuance was important. Real estate in the GCC is not a monolithic asset class, and the conflict was not affecting all sectors equally. Residential transaction volumes had declined sharply in the first weeks, with month-over-month falls in deal activity across the UAE. But participants were careful to distinguish between the absence of transactions, which they attributed to uncertainty and a wide bid-ask spread, and genuine distress, which they were not seeing in any meaningful way.
Sellers were not under pressure to sell. The region's investors are, by and large, long-term holders with strong balance sheets, and the conflict had not created the kind of forced liquidation that generates fire-sale conditions. The more significant dynamic was a standoff between sellers holding to pre-conflict pricing expectations and buyers unwilling to pay those levels until there was greater visibility on the recovery trajectory.
Tourism and hospitality real estate were identified as the sectors most exposed. With international arrivals disrupted, jet fuel costs elevated, and perceptions of physical safety affecting travel decisions, the near-term outlook for hotels, resorts, and retail-facing assets was challenging. Participants managing travel and hospitality assets described active cost restructuring and a deliberate pivot toward diversifying geographically to balance cash flows.
Logistics and industrial real estate were seen in a markedly different light. Institutional appetite for this sector had been strong before the conflict, and participants expected demand to increase further as the crisis underscored the strategic value of well-located warehousing, cold storage, last-mile infrastructure, and industrial land. Cap rates in this segment had been compressing before the conflict, and participants expected that trend to resume once uncertainty cleared, with a potential floor added given higher insurance and operating costs.
On risk pricing, the session was candid. Insurance premiums had risen sharply, with some providers quoting increases of several hundred percent for war-related coverage. Debt financing costs had moved, and refinancing risk was a genuine consideration for assets with near-term maturities. Participants with longer business plans, typically ten years or more, were less concerned. Those with shorter horizons were more exposed.
Data centres and digital infrastructure were highlighted as a structural opportunity, particularly given the region's ambitions around sovereign AI and the growing recognition that redundant, secure data infrastructure was a national strategic asset. The intersection of real estate and infrastructure in this area was expected to attract meaningful capital.
The closing message was consistent with the first session: do not rush, do not panic, and focus on assets with durable fundamentals. Participants advised that the most common mistake in a crisis is both overbuying early and holding back too long. Selectivity and timing would define the returns of those who navigated this period well.
Session Three: Liquidity in GCC Private Markets
What Happens in a Crisis | 9 April 2026 | Participating Firms: Key Capital, Liberte Capital, Al Mal Investment Company
By the time the third session convened, a short ceasefire had provided the first cautious optimism in weeks. The mood among participants was slightly lighter, but the substantive challenges being discussed were no less serious: how does a private markets ecosystem manage liquidity when traditional exit pathways are congested?
The session opened with a candid assessment of the LP community's mindset. European family offices, described as investors who had not experienced conflict on this scale in over eighty years, were placing a new and explicit premium on liquidity. Capital commitments that had been ready to deploy before the conflict were now on hold. Participants were clear that this was a wait-and-see posture rather than a withdrawal, but the distinction, while real, came with practical consequences for GPs expecting to deploy capital on prior timelines.
The valuation conversation was described as highly case-specific. For technology businesses with global revenue streams and strong unit economics, the conflict had introduced short-term disruption without fundamentally altering the investment thesis. For businesses with concentrated UAE exposure in sectors like consumer, retail, or food delivery, the impact was more direct. The concept of valuation lag, the tendency for private asset valuations to reflect market conditions later than public markets, was discussed as a particular consideration for LPs receiving fund reports over the coming quarters.
Secondaries emerged as the most substantive structural discussion. Participants agreed that the region's secondaries market was developing by necessity rather than by design, and that this was not necessarily a problem. Secondary market infrastructure in New York and London had developed in similar ways: a crisis creating demand, demand creating infrastructure, and infrastructure eventually maturing. The challenge was ensuring that what emerged in the GCC was an organised, transparent secondaries market rather than a distressed auction environment.
A clear warning was issued: the secondaries market, globally and locally, contains layers of intermediation, SPVs, and fee structures that can significantly erode returns. Participants with direct access to underlying assets were distinguished from those participating through multiple layers of third-party structures. The advice to investors considering secondaries exposure was unambiguous: understand exactly what you own, how it is structured, and where the fees sit.
On M&A and IPOs, the session was measured. M&A activity, already slowing before the conflict, had effectively paused. IPO pipelines, while not empty, were being extended rather than abandoned. Participants noted that companies with strong fundamentals had no reason to execute at depressed valuations, and that the queue of listings would resume once market conditions supported appropriate pricing. Continuation vehicles, allowing GPs to transfer assets from existing funds into new structures rather than executing forced exits, were discussed as a practical response and one that regulators had been responsive in accommodating.
The session closed on a note of measured optimism. The conflict was forcing a maturity on the market that, while painful in the short term, was creating the conditions for a more disciplined, more transparent, and more liquid private markets ecosystem in the longer term.
Session Four: The Evolution of Private Credit in the Middle East
Trends, Structures, and Scale | 16 April 2026 | Participating Firms: TCW, Ruya Partners, Shorooq, Wide Plains Holding, D Al Tamimi Capital
The fourth session focused on private credit, a sector that had been one of the Gulf's most compelling growth stories in the years before the conflict. The GCC private credit market had been forecast to reach over one trillion dollars by 2026, driven by explosive demand from mid-market companies that traditional banks had consistently underserved. The session asked how the conflict, combined with international headlines around credit market stress, was affecting the regional story.
The first point made, repeatedly, was that global private credit headlines were largely not applicable to the Middle East. The difficulties being reported in the United States, centred on liquidity mismatches between fund structures targeting retail investors and the inherently illiquid nature of the underlying loans, were a product of market architecture that simply did not yet exist in the Gulf. Regional private credit funds were structured as genuine long-term vehicles, with eight to ten-year lifespans and no embedded liquidity promises. The crisis affecting some Western managers was a lesson in what not to build, not a direct threat to what had been built here.
The structural case for private credit in the GCC was restated clearly. Bank penetration for SME lending in the region is among the lowest globally, with commercial banks allocating under three percent of their balance sheets to mid-market lending versus over twenty-five percent in Western markets. This structural gap was the foundation of the asset class locally, and the conflict had, if anything, widened it. In periods of disruption, banks become more conservative, not less. The pipeline of companies seeking institutional debt capital was not declining.
On portfolio management, participants described an immediate shift to higher monitoring frequency in the early weeks of the conflict. Weekly calls replaced monthly reporting for many portfolio companies, with particular attention to cash positions, liquidity buffers, and operational continuity. The performance across sectors was uneven. Companies in MICE, hospitality, and food delivery faced immediate headwinds. Logistics companies serving ground transportation corridors saw demand spikes as supply chain disruption created opportunities for nimble operators. Fitness and wellness businesses with primary exposure to Saudi Arabia, geographically more insulated during this phase, reported record performance.
The structural advantages of senior secured direct lending were highlighted throughout. With low loan-to-value ratios, bilateral lending structures, and strong covenant packages, participants described meaningful cushion before any restructuring conversation would be necessary. The ability to engage with portfolio companies as genuine partners rather than adversarial creditors was presented as both a practice and a structural feature of how regional private credit had been built.
Looking forward, participants identified three priorities. The first was the further development of credit bureau infrastructure across the GCC, which had improved substantially in recent years and was now enabling faster, more confident underwriting. The second was the broadening of the regional allocator base, with sovereign funds, pension schemes, and endowments still underrepresented as limited partners in regional private credit vehicles. The third was the growth of secondary liquidity mechanisms for private credit, which participants saw as an important next stage of market maturity. The session concluded with a consistent message: the regional private credit story remains structurally intact, the conflict has introduced near-term complexity but not altered the fundamental opportunity, and managers who stay disciplined on underwriting and risk management through this period will be well positioned for the years ahead.
Session Five: Private Markets and Geopolitics in the Gulf
Clearing the Macro Fog for Investors | 23 April 2026 | Participating Firms: Emirates NBD, Burkhan World Investments, Janus Henderson, Alagan Partners
The fifth session brought in the widest macro lens of the series, examining the geopolitical and economic environment that private markets investors were being asked to navigate. With a fragile ceasefire in place and significant uncertainty around the Strait of Hormuz, the session opened with a direct question: was the Gulf still a safe haven for capital?
The answers were instructive. The majority of participants said yes, but with important qualifications. The Gulf, and Abu Dhabi in particular, was described not as passive shelter but as a platform for strategic, long-term capital deployment: stable, predictable, and forward-looking in ways that were rare globally. Several participants noted the strength of accumulated national savings, fiscal surpluses, and the activist deployment of sovereign capital into domestic economic development as structural foundations that the conflict had tested but not broken.
A minority view was also represented and given space: that the absolute safety narrative, a key component of the Gulf's investment proposition for international capital over the prior decade, had been punctured by the first weeks of conflict. Geography, long absent from the risk calculus of investors in the region, had reasserted itself. This was not a catastrophic shift, but it was a real one, and it needed to be acknowledged honestly in how the region would market itself to international investors going forward.
The macro disruption picture was laid out in detail. Energy exports had collapsed, with Brent crude elevated and LNG prices to Asia at aggravated levels. Strait of Hormuz disruptions were affecting not only outbound energy flows but the inbound supply chains on which the region's manufacturing, consumer, and import-dependent sectors relied. Travel and tourism, sectors where the UAE was more exposed than less diversified Gulf economies, were suffering disproportionately in the short term. The fiscal strength of larger economies provided a buffer, but the buffer was being drawn on.
On asset allocation, the session moved decisively toward themes of structural necessity over cyclical growth. The framework that gained the most traction grouped assets into defence, infrastructure, compute, and energy, with the argument that these categories were not merely attractive investment themes but foundational national capabilities. These assets tend to be finite, capital intensive, and difficult to replicate, and they perform across market cycles rather than only in benign conditions. Participants noted a clear shift in institutional portfolio construction toward this framing, globally and locally.
The question of the UAE's currency peg and the broader de-dollarisation discussion was addressed directly. The consensus was that the foreign exchange reserves underpinning the peg were substantial and the short-term ability to defend it was not in question. The more interesting discussion was around the longer-term geopolitical realignment being accelerated by the conflict: the deepening of relationships with China, the reorientation of trade relationships, and the positioning of Gulf states as genuinely non-aligned actors in a fragmenting global order. Participants disagreed on the pace and depth of this shift, but not on its direction.
Recovery scenarios were discussed in terms of three possible outcomes. A rapid resolution of the conflict, with energy flows normalising by year end, would allow moderate positive growth across most GCC economies and a relatively swift resumption of investment activity. A prolonged stalemate would extend the disruption and increase the pressure on sovereign buffers. A scenario involving significant infrastructure damage would be categorically different in its implications and would require a reconstruction effort on a scale that would reshape the region's investment landscape entirely. Sovereign wealth funds, increasingly domestically focused and activist in their approach, were identified as the key mechanism through which any recovery would be anchored.
The session closed with a near-unanimous assessment: most participants described themselves as bulls on regional private markets over a twelve month horizon. The caution was real and the near-term headwinds were not being dismissed, but the structural case for the Gulf as a destination for long-term capital remained, in the view of most participants, intact.
A Note on This Series
These sessions were held under Chatham House rule. No individual views, comments, or contributions have been attributed. The summaries above reflect the collective themes and discussions of each session and are intended to provide a record of the conversations the investment community was having during a period of significant uncertainty. The Middle East Investor Network would like to thank all participants for their time, candour, and continued commitment to keeping the professional community connected during a challenging period.
Participating Speakers Across the Series
Alagan Partners
Al Mal Investment Company
Arzan Investment Management
Asas Capital
Burkhan World Investments
D Al Tamimi Capital
Franklin Templeton
GFH Financial Group
Gewan Holding
Janus Henderson
Key Capital
Liberte Capital
Neovision Wealth Management
Ruya Partners
Shorooq
TCW
Wide Plains Holding